MANAGING BALTIMORE'S INNER HARBOR OPERATIONS:
The Need for Direct Day-to-Day Authority and Empowerment

Report from the Greater Baltimore Committee's
Inner Harbor Management Task Force

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Former Baltimore Mayor Theodore McKeldin advanced the concept of transforming the old and dilapidated piers at Baltimore's waterfront into an urban center and destination site nearly 40 years ago. The Greater Baltimore Committee was instrumental in the promotion and acceptance of this visionary utilization of the waterfront. In 1965, the Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management, Inc., a private, not for profit corporation, was formed for the purpose of entering into an exclusive contract with the Mayor and City Council for the planning and development of the Charles Center and Inner Harbor projects. At that time, they were under direction and authority of Baltimore City's Urban Renewal and Housing Commissioner (now known as the Commissioner of Housing and Community Development).

Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management, Inc. performed all of the activities that a city renewal agency would normally perform in a project development. Although it operated independently with a board of directors, its work and activities were under the direction of the commissioner and the Mayor. A private corporation, its sole client was the City of Baltimore and its singular purpose was the renewal projects surrounding Charles Center and the Inner Harbor.

Although a legally constituted corporation, and not a city agency or department with operational responsibilities, it was arguably part of the city government. Its funding was derived from city funding, its budget was included within the city budget under the Urban Renewal and Housing Commission, and it advised on policy but did not set policy. It negotiated but did not have power to enter into contracts with builders, developers, or designers but it did exercise singular authority on issues pertaining to those projects. All government employees, private sector developers and contractors, and citizens clearly knew that issues pertaining to significant urban renewal projects were to be directed to Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management, Inc.

At its peak, Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management, Inc. had an annual operating budget of $1 million. Its contract with the city provided that city government would advance a revolving fund, from which the corporation would pay its expenses including salaries, rent, supplies, travel, etc. and submit records from which it would be reimbursed by the city on a monthly basis.

This quasi-governmental entity enjoyed significant power as its work was directed over city owned land as a result of the passage of the Inner Harbor Project I Renewal Plan. This plan authorized the acquisition of significant property (in excess of 240 acres) on the shores of the harbor waterfront through either direct purchase or eminent domain. Furthermore, the corporation was charged with the authority to direct the Charles Center and Inner Harbor projects through the terms of its contract with the Mayor and the City of Baltimore. The city government, through the Mayor and Urban Renewal and Housing Commissioner (later the Commissioner of Housing and Community Development) established policies under which the corporation would conduct its activities. Any and all reporting of this activity was directed to the Mayor through the Commissioner of Housing and Community Development.

This contract, and the powers contained therein, significantly empowered the entity and provided a clear and an unmistakable signal to the private and public sector of the significant role of Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management, Inc.

In the late 1980s/early 1990s, Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management, Inc., Howard Street Market Place and the Baltimore Economic Development Corporation were folded into a new quasi-public non-profit corporate entity known as the Baltimore Development Corporation. This merger of organizations, along with the fiscal challenges brought about by the recession in early 1990s and the need to create cost-saving measures within city government, brought about a lack of focus and attention to the day-to-day management, maintenance, and operation of the Inner Harbor.

Baltimore Development Corporation was given a much broader economic development responsibility. The Baltimore Development Corporation was charged with the mission to "act as a catalyst in the creation of a robust, sustainable economy for Baltimore and to:

• Retain and attract new businesses
  
• Help businesses expand
  
• Support our cultural resources
  
• Increase employment opportunities for residents
  
• Expand the tax base"

Its broad vision and mission in economic development relegated the focus of the Inner Harbor and its importance to a diminished status in the BDC.

The financial crisis of the early 1990s further exacerbated this problem. First, the general upkeep and maintenance of public lands was not consistent with its overall mandated responsibility. Second, the necessary expenditure of money associated with the regular upkeep and maintenance of the Inner Harbor was not a direct part of Baltimore Development Corporation's budget and, therefore, little attention was directed to that area. Furthermore, the city agency responsible for park and public land upkeep, the Department of Recreation and Parks, found its funds significantly reduced through budgetary reductions and cost savings initiatives and many of its personnel and maintenance responsibilities were transferred and absorbed by the Department of Public Works. The Baltimore Development Corporation and its officers, being a quasi-public entity, had little direct influence with the Department of Recreation and Parks and/or Department of Public Works to secure the manpower and equipment resources from city agencies necessary to address the maintenance problems.

As a result, management of the Inner Harbor was characterized by three dynamics:

a) The lack of a single person, government, or quasi-governmental entity charged with specific oversight of the management and operation of the harbor,

b) The lack of money or the influence to secure the needed manpower and equipment resources necessary to maintain the care and upkeep of the Inner Harbor properly, and

c) The transfer of the maintenance and upkeep responsibilities of the Department of Recreation and Parks to the Department of Public Works as part of budgetary cost containment efforts in the mid-1990's.

The Inner Harbor suffered from a complete lack of focus and attention to the quality of its facilities, supervision of activities, and maintenance of the integrity of the harbor and its activities. This abrogation of authority and direction also left the harbor, its operation, and its stakeholders with no direct city oversight, resulting in haphazard project development, lack of regularly scheduled maintenance and upkeep, and a decline in the aesthetic appearance of the harbor and its shores, thereby tarnishing the charm and allure of this important city resource.

Although the shifting of maintenance operations from the Department of Recreation and Parks to the Department of Public Works may appear logical on its face, it is important to note that during the 1990s the Department of Public Works and its service functions expanded significantly. The Management and Efficiency Report produced by the Greater Baltimore Committee and Presidents' Roundtable described the Department of Public Works in the 1990s as follows:

"With an annual level of funding that approaches half a billion dollars and nearly 5,600 budgeted positions, the Department of Public Works represents a municipal conglomerate that provides an almost unimaginable range of services that impact daily on the lives of every person that lives in, works or visits Baltimore"

As a provider of services to both Baltimore's citizens and its municipal government, DPW is currently required to divide its service and management efforts between two vastly different sets of clientele"

...its dual role as a provider and a consumer of services creates a situation where the service needs of other city departments - departments no less reliant on these internal services of DPW - can be shortchanged."

Article 7, Section 67 of the Baltimore City Charter places the responsibility "to establish, maintain, operate and control parks... and to have charge and control of all such property and activities belonging to, or conducted by, the city" under the Department of Recreation and Parks.

Furthermore, Article 1, Section 9 of the Code entitled "Inner Harbor Park" dedicates for public park uses the portion of the city that lies along the water's edge. This designation under Article 1, Section 9 as a public park places a direct responsibility on the Department of Recreation and Parks and its director. However, as noted in the Management and Efficiency Report of the Department of Recreation and Parks:

"The decimation of the department's budget and the corresponding deterioration in the quantity and quality of recreation and parks services is well known and documented."

The lack of attention to maintenance and upkeep of the Inner Harbor and the lack of leadership in the supervision of harbor activities during the 1990s negatively impacted the harbor as a quality public attraction.

Ultimately, the lack of empowering a single agency or individual with the authority to oversee and direct harbor operations, as existed under the Charles Center-Inner Harbor Management, Inc., left the harbor and its interests without a leading advocate, proponent or manager to ensure its continued quality and attractiveness. This lack of attention and lack of empowerment of authority is the genesis of the current operational mismanagement that exists today.